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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This paper describes many of the fiscal implications to states and school
districts of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001. While considerable am-
biguities exist in the current law and states will implement the law differ-
ently, predictable consequences exist for the school finance system.
Moreover, the nature of these consequences is likely influenced by the
actual implementation of the law. There are both direct and indirect fiscal
implications of the federal education reforms. Direct fiscal consequences
can be substantial for certain types of school districts and for school fund-
ing equity within states, and depend crucially on design considerations
in the implementation of the law. Indirect fiscal implications, through con-
sequences for the special education placement and grade retention sys-
tems, input prices, and house prices, can be substantial as well, and also
depend on the implementation of the policy. This paper also presents
some key design issues for states to consider.
1. INTRODUCTION
The centerpiece of President George W. Bush's domestic policy agenda
during his presidential campaign was education reform, and at the heart
of his education reform proposals was a national system of test-based2 Figlio
school accountability. An amended version of this accountability initia-
tive, codified into law as the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 and
currently in its initial stages of implementation, sets performance goals
for every school, prescribes public school choice for students attend-
ing schools identified as persistently failing, and outlines a set of re-
wards and sanctions for schools and districts that do not meet their
performance goals. School accountability, defined broadly, is favored
by people across the political spectrum, and the No Child Left Behind
Act of 2001 is merely the latest policy initiative in a nationwide trend to-
ward school accountability that is already over a decade old. Indeed,
by the 2001-2002 school year, 31 states already explicitly rated schools
based on some measure of student test performance. By mandating
annual student assessments in grades 3 through 8, requiring states to
reward and sanction schools based on changes over time in these assess-
ments, and tying federal education funding to performance, the new
federal law has further elevated the emphasis on school accountability
nationwide.
In spite of general consensus that school accountability in some form
is desirable and important, considerable debate remains regarding key
questions involved in implementing an accountability system. People
differ substantially on the extent to which students should be tested,
the means of assessing performance, the coverage and frequency of
these examinations, and the ways in which student performance should
reflect on schools. In addition, considerable controversy exists regard-
ing the degree to which explicit rewards and sanctions should be em-
ployed, or whether the provision of information is sufficient to achieve
the goals of accountability systems. While some aspects of these ques-
tions have been resolved (at least temporarily) through the No Child
Left Behind Act, most of the issues relevant for the debate over federal
education policy are still relevant to states in their implementation of the
law.
The principal purpose of this present paper is to describe many of the
fiscal implications to states and school districts of the No Child Left
Behind Act. Despite considerable ambiguities in the current law and
the fact that states will implement the law differently, predictable
consequences will occur for the school finance system. The nature of
these consequences is likely influenced by the actual implementation
of the law. This paper therefore describes both the direct and indirect
fiscal implications of the federal education reforms and, when appro-
priate, discusses how design and implementation details influence these
outcomes.Fiscal Implications of School Accountability Initiatives 3
2. FEDERAL SCHOOL ACCOUNTABILITY
POLICY
The No Child Left Behind Act reauthorized the Elementary and Second-
ary Education Act (ESEA) of 1965, incorporating significant new account-
ability measures. These reforms are linked to funding through Title I of
the ESEA, a program designed to improve the educational outcomes of
low-income students. Because of this funding mechanism, the federal ac-
countability reforms are relevant primarily for schools and districts serv-
ing disadvantaged student populations. Under this law, each state is
required to implement a statewide accountability system in which stu-
dents in grades 3 through 8 are tested annually in reading and mathemat-
ics, and ultimately also in science, with assessments based on the state's
academic standards. Hence, the curricular requirements and level of stan-
dards considered under one state's accountability system may differ sub-
stantially from the same requirements and standards of another state's
system. Under the law, each state must use this accountability system to
assign rewards and sanctions to schools and school districts that receive
Title I money. It is up to the discretion of each state whether it will assign
rewards and sanctions to non-Title I schools, although every school, re-
gardless of whether it receives federal education funding, is subject to the
accountability system put in place by the state. The goal is for each student
in the state to meet that state's proficiency standards by the 2013-2014
academic year.
Schools are evaluated based on whether the school makes "adequate
yearly progress" in a given year. "Adequate yearly progress" is defined
recursively: every student is expected to be proficient by 2013-2014,
which sets an ultimate performance target for that year. To calculate pro-
ficiency targets in years prior to that, each state determines a starting
value for the 2001-2002 school year, based on the distribution of profi-
ciency rates in the state. Between those two school years, a state's profi-
ciency goals for each school will increase in equal increments occurring—
at most—three years apart (with the first increment occurring no later
than 2003-2004). Schools are then deemed as making adequate yearly
progress if their proficiency rates meet or exceed this stated proficiency
target.
However, meeting this target for the entire student test population
(which must be at least 95 percent of eligible test-takers) is not sufficient
to make adequate yearly progress. Rather, every measurable subgroup—
economically disadvantaged students, students from major racial and eth-
nic groups, students with disabilities, and students with limited English4 Figlio
proficiency—must meet the proficiency target for a school to make ade-
quate yearly progress. (Schools with a very small number of students in
a given subgroup are not required to meet proficiency targets for that
group.) If a given subgroup misses its proficiency target, it is still possible
for a school to make adequate yearly progress if each target-missing sub-
group improves sufficiently from one year to the next. Here, "sufficient
improvement" is defined as the percentage of students below the profi-
ciency level in that subgroup falling by at least 10 percent compared to
the preceding year, as long as that subgroup improved along other lines,
such as in terms of graduation or promotion to a higher school level.
While states must assess each school annually, they may use as many as
three years' worth of data to measure school proficiency, as long as they
apply the same criteria to all schools consistently. Schools must meet their
proficiency targets in both reading and mathematics to make adequate
yearly progress.
The No Child Left Behind Act outlines a series of actions to be taken
if a school fails to meet its proficiency targets. If a school fails to make
adequate yearly progress in a single year, no action is mandated by the
federal government (though states may still decide to take action.) If a
school fails to make adequate yearly progress in two consecutive years,
however, the school is designated as being "in improvement," and several
actions are taken immediately. First, the school must develop a two-year
school improvement plan that includes "research-based strategies for im-
provement," which could include an extended school day or school year,
strategies for increasing parental involvement, and new teacher men-
toring. As part of this plan, 10 percent of the Title I funds must be set
aside for professional development.
In addition, all students attending a school in the improvement phase
are offered public school choice. The district must offer students the op-
portunity to attend a higher-rated public school in the district, with trans-
portation; if a sufficient number of slots are unavailable, then students
may attend school in a neighboring school district on a space-available
basis (but without provided transportation). Students are permitted to
remain in the higher-rated school through that school's terminal grade,
even if their original school begins to make adequate yearly progress (in
the event that this improvement occurs, they will no longer be provided
transportation). In the event that there are not sufficient slots available in
higher-performing schools in the district, preference will be given to low-
performing, low-income students. If a school remains in the improvement
stage for a second year, all previously mentioned remedies will remain
in force, but in addition, low-income families in affected schools will be
offered supplemental educational services, such as private tutoring. Un-Fiscal Implications of School Accountability Initiatives 5
der the new law, school districts must expend up to 20 percent of their
Title I allocations to provide supplemental services and choice-related
transportation.
Schools that fail to make adequate yearly progress for four consecutive
years enter into the "corrective action" stage of federal sanctions. In this
case, school districts must continue to offer public school choice and sup-
plemental services to families, but they must also take one of six actions:
(1) replace school staff deemed responsible for the school's continued fail-
ure to make adequate yearly progress, (2) implement a new curriculum
centered around "scientifically based research," (3) substantially decrease
the authority of management at the school, (4) extend the school day or
school year, (5) appoint an outside expert to advise the school on its prog-
ress toward making adequate yearly progress, or (6) reorganize the
school. In the fifth consecutive year of failure to make adequate yearly
progress, the school must undergo restructuring in which, for instance,
the school district has one year to reopen the school as a charter school,
replace its principal and staff, contract with a private management com-
pany, or allow the state to take over the school. At any stage, the state
may introduce its own sanctions as well; the federally mandated sanctions
are minimum requirements.
3. DIRECT CONSEQUENCES FOR SCHOOL
FINANCE
3.1 The Federal Role in School Finance
While the lion's share of K-12 education funding comes from state and
local sources, the federal government plays a significant role in the fund-
ing of local public schools, primarily in districts serving large numbers
of disadvantaged children. As mentioned above, the federal accountabil-
ity law ties school performance to Title I funding. Describing in detail the
specific mechanism for the delivery of Title I funding is not relevant for
this paper, but it can be roughly described as follows. Title I grants are
allocated to school districts through several mechanisms. Seventy percent
of the $10 billion expended in Title I grants in 2002 are so-called basic
grants, which are assigned to school districts on the basis of disadvan-
taged child counts as long as at least 2 percent of the district's school-age
population is disadvantaged. Over 99 percent of school districts are eligi-
ble for and receive some basic grant. School districts with higher concen-
trations of disadvantaged children (at least 15 percent of the school-age
population, or at least 6,500 disadvantaged children) are eligible to receive
a concentration grant: a nonlinear allocation based on the number of6 Figlio
eligible children in the district. "Education Finance Incentive Grants"
make allocations that account for the intensity with which states fund
education and the degree of equity in the state's system.
School districts have considerable latitude in determining the use of
Title I funds. While these funds are dedicated to improving the academic
outcomes of low-performing, disadvantaged children, the mechanisms
through which these funds are expended are plentiful. And if sufficiently
large numbers of targeted students are present in a school, the funds can
be used for schoolwide programs. Of course, to the degree to which
money is fungible, in essence these funds could almost be considered
grants for schoolwide programs, Gordon (2001) shows that states and lo-
calities adjust downward their funding of schools as Title I grants in-
crease. This fact is directly relevant for this paper because federal and
state requirements that districts use a large fraction (or perhaps all) of the
Title I funds for noninstructional purposes (e.g., school choice-related
transportation or privately provided supplemental services) may lead to
significant reductions in instructional spending in affected districts.
In 2002, Title I grants per pupil averaged $198 (weighted by total district
student membership), or $940 per low-income student. But these averages
mask considerable heterogeneity in the magnitude of the grants. Nearly
10 percent of school districts, representing 11 percent of the student popu-
lation in the United States, average more than $400 per student, and just
over 2 percent of school districts, representing one-half of 1 percent of
the student population, average more than $700 per student. One-third
of school districts, representing 32 percent of the low-income student pop-
ulation, receive over $1,000 in Title I grants per disadvantaged student,
and almost 5 percent of school districts, representing one-half of 1 percent
of the low-income student population, receive over $1,500 per disadvan-
taged student.
Title I grants are highly concentrated. Of the over 13,000 school districts
in the United States, more than one-quarter of the total expenditures go
to the 25 school districts with Title I allocations of more than $30 million,
and 40 percent of the total expenditures go to the 114 school districts with
Title I allocations of more than $10 million. The top 25 school districts,
ranked in terms of total allocation, average $407 in Title I aid per pupil
and $1,122 in aid per disadvantaged pupil. The top 114 school districts
average $339 per pupil and $1,062 per disadvantaged pupil. Table 1 pre-
sents information on the 25 school districts that together receive one-
quarter of the total Title I aid. The figures in Table 1 are for 2002, except
for the share of total revenues in a district, which is for 1997, the last year
for which I have comparable data. Title I comprises a substantial frac-
tion of total current expenditures for each of these school districts, andFiscal Implications of School Accountability Initiatives 7
TABLE 1
Title I Receipts in the 25 School Districts Receiving the Most
Federal Aid*
School district name














































































































































* These data come from the Common Core of Data and Title I Office of the U.S. Department of Education.
Cells denoted with N/A indicate that data were unavailable for the relevant year.
presumably a considerably larger fraction of total current expenditure in
the schools serving disadvantaged students. The reliance on federal
aid ranges dramatically, however, even within this set of highly reliant
school districts. Orleans Parish, Louisiana, for instance, has almost three
times the federal share of total revenue as does Broward County, Florida.
School districts receiving large amounts of Title I aid are not necessarily
those that are the poorest; indeed, many of these districts are relatively
wealthy. However, these districts tend to have very large concentrations8 Figlio
TABLE 2
Title I Receipts in the 25 Large School Districts Receiving the Largest















































































































































* These data come from the Common Core of Data and Title I Office of the U.S. Department of Education.
of low-income students and arguably have higher costs of education than
many lower-wealth school districts.
Table 2 presents similar information, this time on the 25 school districts
with more than 15,000 students that have the highest per pupil Title I
receipts. Note the high variation in Title I receipts per pupil: even among
the 25 large school districts with the highest per pupil Title I revenues,
the highest-revenue district has almost twice as much Title I revenue per
pupil as the twenty-fifth highest-revenue district. If a minimum of 20 per-
cent of this Title I allocation is at risk under the No Child Left BehindFiscal Implications of School Accountability Initiatives 9
Act's accountability system, a sizable portion of expenditures in Ameri-
ca's largest school districts might be diverted under the federal account-
ability law. Because some smaller districts receive more than 10 percent
of their total revenues from Title I grants, the potential direct fiscal conse-
quences are greater still for some school districts.
3.2 Which Schools Are Likely to Be Sanctioned?
As mentioned above, the federal accountability system lays out timetables
for sanctions against schools that persistently fail to meet performance
goals. While states have some flexibility in measuring proficiency, states
are restricted to setting the starting value for the accountability system's
proficiency goals at the twentieth percentile of the state's distribution.
One can therefore make some preliminary forecasts about the attributes
of the schools likely to be sanctioned under the law, at least in the early
years of the policy.
I employed performance data on the Florida Comprehensive Assess-
ment Test, the standards-based assessment test that Florida will use to
comply with the requirements of the federal accountability law. I limited
my analyses to the elementary school grades tested throughout the entire
time period—fourth grade for reading and fifth grade for mathematics.
For the purposes of simulating the effects of the federal law, I assumed
that the first year of testing counted for the purposes of accountability
was given in the 1998-1999 school year, so that four years of testing would
now have been conducted. Hence, I could identify which schools might
have been in the third year of "improvement" after the 2001-2002 school
year and could also attempt to gauge the effects of the first federally man-
dated increase in proficiency targets on the distribution of sanctioned
schools. Of course, this exercise assumed that schools do not respond to
the federal accountability system in ways that would affect student test
performance. This assumption is a major weakness of this type of projec-
tion because increased test performance is, of course, the purpose of en-
hanced school accountability. Thus, these projections can be thought of
as a first approximation of what might have happened. Test scores for
1998-1999 were the first year of Florida's new accountability system, Gov-
ernor Jeb Bush's A+ Plan for Education, which imposed potentially
harsher sanctions and enhanced rewards based on student test perfor-
mance. Florida is thus an ideal place to make projections about the poten-
tial effects of a national system of school accountability on the distribution
of sanctions.
While Florida's experience with an accountability system similar in na-
ture to the federal system currently being implemented makes Florida a
desirable place to address this question along many dimensions, Florida10 Figlio
is imperfect in other ways. Florida districts rely less on federal education
aid than do comparable school districts in much of the rest of the country.
More important, schools in Florida districts tend to be more racially and
ethnically heterogeneous than in the United States in general. However,
patterns of test performance in Florida match those in other states, such
as California, North Carolina, and Texas, which suggests that Florida data
are usable for the present purposes. Because Florida districts tend to rely
less on federal aid than do similar districts elsewhere in the country, one
consequence of using Florida data for the present study is that the magni-
tudes of the forecasted effects of the federal accountability system are
likely to be understated. Under conservative assumptions, within three
years, many school districts in Florida would lose as much as 1 percent
or more of their current expenditure as a result of federally mandated
sanctions. In other parts of the United States, where schools are more
reliant on federal aid, similar school districts may lose as much as 2 per-
cent of current expenditures. I should point out, however, that these pro-
jections are highly speculative because most of the factors that would
ultimately determine the incidence of the federally mandated sanctions
have yet to be decided.
For a first pass through the data, I assumed that every subgroup within
a school has the same proficiency rates as the school average. (I was forced
to assume so because I did not have sufficient subgroup-level data for all
four years for the entire state. Later I relaxed this assumption and used
a subset of the state where I had adequate data to clarify this question a
bit more.) To the extent to which this assumption is not valid, it will un-
derstate the number of schools that are sanctioned under the program.
The No Child Left Behind Act requires not only that the school, as a
whole, meet proficiency standards but also that each subgroup within
the school meet the same standards. If any subgroup fails to meet the
standards, the entire school is deemed as not making adequate yearly
progress.
Because there is flexibility at the state level about whether to use a high
or low standard for defining student proficiency, for the purposes of these
simulations I investigated two different proficiency standards—one in
which students need to reach level 2 out of 5 on the Florida Comprehen-
sive Assessment Test to be deemed proficient, and one in which students
must reach level 3 on the test to be deemed proficient. The target level
for the first year (1998-1999) would be 48 percent proficient in reading
and 51 percent proficient in mathematics if the lower of the two standards
were employed, and 31 percent proficient in reading and 18 percent pro-
ficient in mathematics if the higher of the two standards were employed.
These targets would then rise to 57 percent and 59 percent, respectively,Fiscal Implications of School Accountability Initiatives 11
TABLE 3
Attributes of Florida Schools Forecast to Be Sanctioned if the No
Child Left Behind Act Took Effect in 1999*
Percentage Per pupil
Percentage Percentage free-lunch- Title I
black Hispanic eligible aid, 2002
Title I schools 36.1 22.4 58.5 $850
Using more lenient definition of proficiency
Schools sanctioned in first
year of simulations 60.5 27.7 77.4
Schools sanctioned in sec-
ond year of sanctions 58.9 29.0 77.3
Schools sanctioned in
third year of sanctions 53.9 26.8 72.7
Using more stringent definition of proficiency
Schools sanctioned in first
year of simulations 63.6 25.2 77.9
Schools sanctioned in sec-
ond year of sanctions 62.2 25.5 76.7 $865
Schools sanctioned in
third year of sanctions 50.5 24.7 69.9 $860
* These figures describe the demographic and socioeconomic attributes of Florida schools simulated to
be sanctioned in each of the first three years of the federal accountability law if the law took effect in
1999. The figures are a result of simulations of the federal accountability law in Florida using school-
level data from Florida from 1998-1999 through 2001-2002. Two proficiency targets were used, based
on different choices that the state of Florida could make.
if the low standard were employed after the first incremental increase in
school standards, and to 43 percent and 32 percent, respectively, if the
higher standard were employed.
Table 3 presents some basic attributes of the schools that would be
sanctioned under these scenarios in each of three years—1999-2000,
2000-2001, and 2001-2002. For the purposes of this analysis, I did not
distinguish between the types of sanction employed, be it public school
choice or mandatory provision of supplemental services. The next version
of this paper will make this distinction if the differences warrant it. From
the table, you can see that, regardless of the standard employed, the
schools likely to be sanctioned are particularly disadvantaged, even rela-
tive to the population of disadvantaged Title I schools eligible for sanc-
tion. For instance, while the typical Title I school in Florida has a student
body that is 59 percent free-lunch-eligible, 37 percent black, and 22 per-
cent Hispanic, the typical school predicted to be sanctioned (using the
low measure of standards) in the first year has a population that is 77
percent free-lunch-eligible, 61 percent black, and 28 percent Hispanic.12 Figlio
Almost the same attributes of sanctioned schools are apparent if the
higher level of student standards is employed. Using this standards mea-
sure, the typical school forecast to be sanctioned has a student body that is
78 percent free-lunch-eligible, 64 percent black, and 25 percent Hispanic.
As the policy progresses and standards ratchet up, however, this gap
between the typical Title I school and the typical sanctioned school is
projected to tighten, although it will still remain large. By the third year
of potential sanctions, for instance, I forecasted that 73 percent of the stu-
dents at sanctioned schools will be free-lunch-eligible, 54 percent will be
black, and 27 percent will be Hispanic, if the low measure of student stan-
dards were employed. If the higher measure of student standards were
employed, the gap would be slightly more narrow: the typical sanctioned
school would have a student body that is 70 percent free-lunch-eligible,
51 percent black, and 25 percent Hispanic. Despite this narrowing of
the gap, however, four years into the program, the typical school likely
to be sanctioned under the federal law would still be disproportionately
disadvantaged.
There are both social and fiscal reasons why we should care about the
demographic characteristics of the schools likely to be sanctioned under
the federal accountability laws. The social reasons stem from the basic
purposes of the accountability law—to improve the quality of education
for students trapped in chronically low-performing schools. While ac-
countability pressures may induce schools to improve, removing finances
from these same schools (which may actually provide high value added
even if overall proficiency levels remain low) could reduce school quality
for the students most in need of school improvement or remediation. The
benefits of providing a within-district exit option are weakened if district-
level sanctions affect all schools in a district. From a fiscal perspective,
low-socioeconomic-status schools could be expected to have a harder time
raising the funds to replace lost federal aid, and are also precisely the
schools for whom many states have reformed their school finance sys-
tems. The withdrawal of federal aid from these districts may place state
school finance systems out of compliance with court orders in some states,
requiring a change in the level or distribution of state aid. At the same
time, if states changed their school finance systems to compensate school
districts for the loss of federal revenues resulting from sanctions, such a
move would undermine the incentive effects of the introduction of a
school accountability system.
In Florida, however, it does not appear that the schools likely to be
sanctioned are disproportionately located in school districts that rely
heavily on Title I aid. In Florida, the average per pupil Title I grant per
disadvantaged child is $847. But the district average per pupil Title I grantFiscal Implications of School Accountability Initiatives 13
per disadvantaged child for sanctioned schools is $866 in the first year of
sanctions, regardless of the measure of sanction used. By the third year
of potential sanctions, this figure falls slightly more to $860. This trend
may be peculiar to Florida, where poverty is less concentrated than in
many other states. When Florida data are used to calibrate projections for
the nation as a whole, however, I still found that the districts with schools
forecast to be sanctioned were only mildly more reliant on Title I funds
than were school districts without sanctioned schools. However, federal
aid represents a larger share of total revenues for the districts of the sanc-
tioned schools than it does for the districts of nonsanctioned schools.
Thus, sanctions may hurt the school districts for whom a loss of federal
school aid represents a larger percentage reduction in total spending
power.
Large differences exist across districts in the fraction of the Title I stu-
dent body who attend schools that are predicted to be sanctioned. Table
4 presents the tenth, twenty-fifth, fiftieth, seventy-fifth, and ninetieth per-
centile districts (weighted by Title I student body population) in each
year, with each measure of student proficiency standards ranked ac-
cording to the fraction of disadvantaged students in the school district
attending schools predicted to be sanctioned. Using both measures of pro-
ficiency standards, at least one-quarter of students are forecast to attend
schools in districts in which no schools are sanctioned in the first year in
which sanctions are possible. Even in the third potential year of sanctions,
the twenty-fifth percentile school district has less than 1 percent of its
TABLE 4
Distribution of School District Percentage of Disadvantaged Students
Attending Sanctioned Schools—Projections Based on Florida Data*
Percentage attending
sanctioned schools in 10 25
Using more lenient definition of proficiency
First year of sanctions
Second year of sanctions




Using more stringent definition of
First year of sanctions
Second year of sanctions

































* These figures describe the distribution across school districts of the percentage of disadvantaged stu-
dents currently attending Florida schools simulated to be sanctioned in each of the first three years of
the federal accountability law if the law took effect in 1999. The figures are a result of simulations of the
federal accountability law in Florida using school-level data from Florida from 1998-1999 through 2001-
2002. Two proficiency targets were used, based on different choices that the state of Florida could make.14 Figlio
disadvantaged students attending schools that would be sanctioned if the
low measure of student standards is used, and a more robust 13 percent
attending sanctioned schools if the higher measure of student standards
is used. On the other hand, for at least 10 percent of school districts, one-
third or more of the disadvantaged student body population would at-
tend schools that are sanctioned. By the third year of potential sanctions,
for the ninetieth percentile school in the model, where proficiency targets
are based on the more rigorous student standards, 52 percent of disadvan-
taged students would attend schools sanctioned under the federal law.
Given the federal regulations, at least one-fifth of this percentage of Title
I funding is at risk. Put differently, if half of a school district's disadvan-
taged students attend sanctioned schools, then a minimum of 10 percent
of the school district's Title I allocation may be diverted to choice-related
transportation or private school supplementation. In some school dis-
tricts, this figure would exceed 1 percent of a school district's total reve-
nues and would represent a larger fraction of the school district's current
expenditures.
While Table 4 does not present these results, I also performed these
projections while restricting myself to the schools that are heavily minor-
ity—at least 90 percent black or Hispanic. Even among these schools, a
large difference exists across school districts in the fractions of disadvan-
taged students attending sanctioned schools. By year three of sanctions,
the tenth percentile district is projected to have 14 percent of students
attending sanctioned schools, while the ninetieth percentile district is pro-
jected to have 61 percent of students attending sanctioned schools, if the
less stringent measure of student proficiency is employed. Using the more
stringent measure of proficiency, by year three of the sanctions, the tenth
percentile district is projected to have 46 percent of students attending
sanctioned schools, while the ninetieth percentile district is projected to
have 79 percent of students attending sanctioned schools. Therefore, the
sanctions required by the No Child Left Behind Act could affect some
school districts, even with similar demographics, much more significantly
than others.
These projections all assume that each subgroup is as successful as the
school as a whole in reaching proficiency targets. But it is unlikely that
this assumption will be true. (Indeed, the authors of the law had this
unlikelihood in mind when mandating that each subgroup meet profi-
ciency targets.) While I do not have sufficient data to perform the same
analysis for each subgroup, I could do a similar analysis using slightly
earlier data (here, I assumed that the policy began in 1995-1996) and for
a subset of the counties of Florida. For confidentiality purposes, I do not
name the counties included in this analysis; however, they tend to beFiscal Implications of School Accountability Initiatives 15
larger, more urban counties with considerably greater poverty rates than
the rest of the state. These attributes of the counties I used make them
unrepresentative of the state of Florida, much less the United States, but
for this purpose, this exercise should still be sufficient to gauge the po-
tential complications that the subgroup-proficiency requirement would
introduce.
For the purposes of comparison, in this subgroup analysis, I set the
initial target levels so that 31 percent of students would be proficient in
reading in the first year of data (1995-1996) and 18 percent of students
would be proficient in mathematics in the first year of data. Since the
Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test was not being used during the
entire subgroup study period, I used third-, fourth-, and fifth-graders'
performance on the Stanford-9 achievement test as a proxy. While not
reported herein, I have experimented with other cutpoints and grades,
and the basic findings reported below remain unchanged.
Table 5 presents the predicted rates of school sanction in each of the
first three years of sanctions, assuming that the first year of potential sanc-
tion is now 1996-1997. As a basis for comparison, consider the first col-
umn of the table, which projects the rate of sanctions based on the
assumption that all subgroups have the same pass rate as the school as
a whole. (These same criteria were used in the previous exercises.) This
first exercise is important because the set of schools, the test used to evalu-
ate them, and the years of study all differ from those employed previ-
ously. Using this set of assumptions, 60 percent of schools in this poorer,
more urban subset of the counties of Florida are predicted to be sanc-
tioned in the first year of sanctions, and by year three of the program,
TABLE 5
Percentage of Schools Forecast to Be Sanctioned in Subset of Florida,
by Year of Sanction, When Subgroups Are Considered*
No subgroup Subgroup proficiency
Year of sanctions proficiency requirement requirement
First year 60 89
Second year 62 92
Third year 82 96
* These figures describe the percentage of schools forecast to be sanctioned in each of the first three years
of the federal accountability law in a subset of unnamed (though more heavily poor, minority, and urban)
counties in Florida once performance targets must be met by schools for the school overall, the school's
free-lunch-eligible students, the school's black students, the school's Hispanic students, and the school's
white students. The figures are a result of simulations of the federal accountability law in Florida using
student-level data from a subset of Florida school districts from 1995-1996 through 1999-2000: the most
recent data I have available. Data come from the Florida department of education and the relevant school
districts.16 Figlio
82 percent of schools are forecast to be sanctioned. But these forecast rates
of sanctions pale in comparison to the rates if the assumption of equal
pass rates is relaxed, and actual pass rates by subgroups are used. Requir-
ing schools with more than 20 test-takers in any subgroup (black students,
Hispanic students, white students, and free-lunch-eligible students) to
meet performance targets for that subgroup also increased the forecast
sanction rates to 89 percent in the first year of sanctions and to 96 percent
in the third year of sanctions. Note that this large increase in the forecast
sanction rates is still understated (though it could hardly go higher) be-
cause I included fewer subgroups in the present analysis than the federal
law requires to present conservative comparisons. The point herein is
clear: the requirement that schools must meet performance targets for
each countable subgroup in that school leads to substantially increased
rates of sanctions under the federal accountability law.
Table 6 explores whether the inclusion or exclusion of subgroups is
likely to influence the racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic composition of
the schools sanctioned under the No Child Left Behind Act. As before,
because the set of schools, years, and tests employed differ in this analysis
from that of the preceding analysis, the table presents data for the attri-
butes of schools sanctioned under both situations—including and exclud-
ing subgroup requirements. Requiring all subgroups to meet performance
requirements increases the socioeconomic status of the schools forecast
to be sanctioned under the federal law. While the set of sanctioned schools
is still more disadvantaged than the population of schools as a whole,
requiring schools to meet performance criteria in all subgroups is a more
inclusive standard.
3.3 Implications for Equity
As the previous sections of this paper make clear, the overwhelming inci-
dence of the direct fiscal effects of the federal accountability reforms will
likely be borne by districts serving large numbers of low-income students,
particularly in the early years of the program. This situation is in large
measure deterministic because the federal accountability rules effectively
sanction only low-income schools (because sanctions are tied to Title I
allocations). Even among Title I schools, however, the incidence of ac-
countability sanctions will likely affect mainly the particularly poor and
heavily minority communities.
As a result, the federal accountability program, as mentioned above,
will likely work to offset some of the school finance equalizations put
forward by state legislatures or ordered by state supreme courts. (Inciden-
tally, this disequilibrium also counteracts one of the goals of the federal
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states that have more equalized school finance systems.) As described
above, the school districts with the highest fractions of minority and low-
income students—precisely the districts typically supported in school fi-
nance equalization scenarios—are the schools projected to lose the most
under the federal accountability rules. If this scenario triggers further
equalization aid from the state, it will lead to increased fiscal responsibil-
ity from the state. (On the other hand, this state bailout would undermine
the goals of the federal accountability system.) Alternatively, districts
would either have less revenue with which to work or would need to
raise revenues to replace the lost Title I grants.
This scenario highlights an interesting tension between school equity
and school accountability objectives. One of the principal arguments
for school accountability programs is, in essence, an equity argument: the
schools that may be most in need of accountability pressure are the
schools that face the least competition or parental oversight. Presumably,
these schools serve families that are either liquidity-constrained or minor-
ity. If these types of schools generally constitute the bottom of the equity
distribution, so to speak, accountability systems could lead to differential
improvements in the performance of these schools, which may in turn
narrow the gap between the richest and poorest schools, or the richest
and poorest members of society. On the other hand, if schools serving
low-socioeconomic-status students are more able to "game the system"
because they lack parental oversight, accountability systems could lead
to no change in the distribution of school performance, or perhaps even
a widening of the gap between the haves and have nots. If school account-
ability systems base financial rewards and punishments on student test
performance, then these gaps could still increase. School accountability
systems that base rewards and sanctions on the levels of test performance,
such as those mandated by the No Child Left Behind Act, are particularly
vulnerable to this predicament, unless corrections are made, such as in
California and South Carolina, for family background characteristics.
Even accountability systems that base rewards and sanctions on value-
added measures of student performance may be vulnerable if these mea-
sures of value added, or student test score gains in general, are correlated
with socioeconomic or other student background characteristics. Like-
wise, programs aimed at increasing equity could have the consequence
of undermining accountability objectives. For instance, Duncombe and
Yinger (forthcoming) find that block grants and matching aid lead to re-
ductions in school efficiency.
While such an exercise is imperfect, it is possible to use Florida data to
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perform this projection, I predicted first the probability that a school will
be sanctioned using Florida data and basic socio-demographic character-
istics of the school. These factors explain approximately 80 percent of the
variation in sanction probability in Florida, so they seem reasonable as
a first approximation. Using these coefficient estimates generated from
Florida data, I predicted the probability that each school in the United
States will be sanctioned. (Again, this prediction assumes that the rela-
tionship between demographics and the distribution of test performance
is the same nationally as it is in Florida and that other states have similar
testing policies and difficulty levels as does Florida.) From these predic-
tions, I identified the percentage of schools in each district nationwide
likely to be sanctioned under these circumstances, and I multiplied this
district-specific percentage by the district's share of the federal aid offi-
cially at risk under federal law.
Table 7 shows the breakdown of likely lost federal dollars per pupil by
school district income quartile in each of the six largest states except for
Illinois, where I had insufficient data to conduct the exercise. As the table
shows, the incidence of the federal accountability system is heavily borne
by the poorest school districts, precisely the districts that state school aid
formulas are intended to help. A nontrivial fraction of state-performed
school fiscal equalization would be undone even under this most conser-
vative of estimates. The consequence would be a partially disequalized
school finance system or, alternatively, an increase in the state's responsi-
bility to fund education. In addition, as mentioned below, if input prices
change further as a result of the accountability system (as may be ex-
pected) the effective disequalization could be considerably greater. This
last point, however, is merely speculative.
TABLE 7
Predicted per Pupil Effective Reduction (in Dollars) in Title I Aid to
Districts, Grouped by Poverty Quartile by State, Under Certain
Assumptions
State poverty quartile Poorest
5 percent





































4. INDIRECT FISCAL CONSEQUENCES
OF ACCOUNTABILITY SYSTEMS
Besides the direct fiscal consequences put in place in both the federal ac-
countability system and potentially as part of state accountability systems,
several indirect fiscal consequences are likely under the imposition of an
accountability program. This section briefly describes several of these po-
tential indirect effects, including behavioral responses that have direct
fiscal consequences, such as the classification of students as disabled, as
well as other implications of accountability, such as changes in house
prices and the teacher labor market, that could have less direct implica-
tions. However, the indirect fiscal consequences may be larger in magni-
tude for states and localities than the direct fiscal effects.
4.1 Special Education Placement
Schools have many potential behavioral responses to accountability.
Schools may react to accountability incentives by increasing class time
spent on subjects and topics that are emphasized in the accountability
exams, while decreasing class time on subjects and topics either not in or
not emphasized in the exams. But another potential reaction to the incen-
tives created by accountability systems involves the classification of stu-
dents into special education categories exempt from taking the tests used
for school grading. Schools can potentially improve their state-assigned
grade or classification by taking their poorest performing students out of
the testing pool and classifying them into the special education categories
exempt from taking the tests. The schools can also potentially improve
their state-assigned grade or classification by refraining from classifying
better-performing students into the special education categories exempt
from taking the tests. The new national study on special education costs
by the American Institutes for Research (AIR) helps demonstrate the po-
tential flexibility and opportunity that school decisionmakers have in de-
termining which, if any, special education category in which to place
students. AIR finds very wide variation in costs and services within single
special education categories. In fact, they find less than 10 percent of the
variation in special education costs in carrying out individualized educa-
tion plans can be explained by the exceptionality categories in the
federal/state indicator record (Chambers et al., 2002). This finding im-
plies that there may be significant discretion in classifying individuals
with specifically identifiable needs. Cullen (2002) and Cullen and Figlio
(1998) show that schools classify students as disabled in response to fiscal
incentives; it seems natural to expect that they might also classify students
as disabled in response to accountability incentives.Fiscal Implications of School Accountability Initiatives 21
Regardless of how children are classified, however, the cost implica-
tions of this reclassification could be very large. Chambers et al. (2002)
indicate that the average student classified as requiring special education
services costs schools more than twice that of the average regular educa-
tion student. The approximate comparison, of course, concerns the mar-
ginal student, for whom cost estimates are much more difficult to make.
But the reclassifications of even these students generate large costs to
states, which average 40 percent greater reimbursements (calculated de-
terministically, in most states, based on classification rates) for marginally
disabled students than for regular education students, regardless of actual
cost differences realized. Indeed, Cullen and Figlio (1998) explore this po-
tential for fiscal gaming in their study.
Several recent studies point to the possibility of schools responding to
accountability systems by reshaping the testing pool. Using student fixed-
effects models, Figlio and Getzler (2002) find that schools in two large
Florida counties tend to respond to accountability pressures by switching
previously low-performing children from regular education into special
education classes exempt from inclusion in the testing program for the
purposes of accountability, and that these responses are particularly
strong for students attending schools likely to be sanctioned under the
accountability program. Figlio and Getzler find, for instance, that classifi-
cation rates of marginal students may increase by as much as one-quarter
or more in schools threatened with accountability sanctions. Jacob (2002)
looked at the effects of test-based accountability in Chicago and showed
that low-achieving students in struggling schools are the most likely to be
placed in special education. While Jacob does not estimate student fixed-
effects models, he does control for prior achievement test scores and back-
ground characteristics. Using aggregate data and a clever identification
strategy, Cullen and Reback (2002) exploit the discontinuity in rewards
in the accountability system in Texas to show that schools respond to
incentives to shape the test pool. These three papers, taken together, pre-
sent complementary evidence—in three states and with three very differ-
ent identification strategies—that schools respond to the incentive to clas-
sify marginal students in special education. The federal accountability
system provides fewer incentives to reclassify students as disabled be-
cause disabled students' performance, except in the most extreme cases,
are counted for federal accountability purposes. However, the state ac-
countability systems mandated by the No Child Left Behind Act may
(and, indeed, in many cases, do) still provide these types of incentives,
suggesting that special education placement is potentially a major re-
sponse to school accountability systems.
As mentioned above, student reclassification as a result of school ac-22 Figlio
countability systems have fiscal as well as educational implications. Stu-
dent classification as disabled, even in the most moderate disability
categories, introduces large incremental costs to school districts and
states. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act requires that all
disabled students receive special services and an educational environ-
ment appropriate for their educational needs. State school finance systems
increase state payments to school districts by an average of 40 percent
when a student is classified as learning disabled. As Cullen and Figlio
(1998) point out, in some states this incremental revenue exceeds the likely
cost of reclassifying a student and in other states it may not. In most states,
the additional costs would be shared (to different degrees, depending on
the system and depending on the degree to which reclassification truly
generates substantial marginal costs to the school district) between the
state and the school district. But in a growing number of states, the state
allocation to districts for special education finance is based not on actual
special education counts but rather on predicted special education counts.
In these states, the full fiscal burden of reclassification is borne by the
school district, implying that school districts in these states have mixed
incentives to reclassify students as disabled in response to accountability
systems.
Schools have the same incentives to retain low-performing students in
their current grade as they do to reclassify students as disabled, except
in the terminal grades at a given school—then they have an incen-
tive under the federal accountability system at least to promote low-
performing students to the next grade. Therefore, there are also potential
fiscal consequences associated with student grade retention. Unlike the
case of special education placement, where in some states, school districts
would bear the full fiscal cost of reclassifying a student as disabled in
response to accountability pressures, student retentions in their current
grade would mean that states always bear part of the costs of the school
district responses to the accountability system.
4.2 Effects on Input Prices
The historical experience with fiscal accountability suggests that input
prices may also change with increased academic performance accountabil-
ity. As one example, Figlio and Rueben (2001) show that one consequence
of the so-called tax revolt of the late 1970s and 1980s was that many
higher-quality teachers left teaching and tended to be replaced by lower-
quality teachers (where quality is measured by higher-quality teachers'
test scores). They find that much of this response was not due to actual
changes in resources but rather, apparently, to changes in perceptions.
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gests that teachers, when they perceive that school grading is arbitrary
or biased against their schools, are likely to contemplate leaving their
schools. This situation may be one of the reasons why Downes and Figlio
(1998) and Figlio (1997a) found evidence of much larger effects of tax
limits than would be predicted by looking at the changes in actual school
revenues and spending. These pieces of evidence indicate that teacher
input costs may increase with school accountability and that the increases
may be differentially borne by low socioeconomic-status school dis-
tricts—precisely the districts that already face inflated teacher costs for
any given unit of teacher quality. While this last point is speculative, it
does suggest that hasty design of a school accountability system or perfor-
mance standards embedded within a state aid system might have unin-
tended consequences that work against the goals of the accountability
system.
4.3 Effects on House Prices
Compelling evidence from Black (1999) and others shows that house
prices reflect student test scores. Test scores have become well publicized
in most states over the past decade, even in the absence of the federal
accountability system. But ratings of schools may present additional infor-
mation to the community, and this additional information may influence
house prices, regardless of the quality of the signal presented in the school
grading mechanism.
Figlio and Lucas (2000) studied the effects on the Gainesville, Florida,
housing market of the introduction of Florida's A+ accountability sys-
tem in 1999. Using a house-level, fixed effects specification and control-
ling for time-varying neighborhood effects, they show that while test
scores remain capitalized into house prices following the introduction of
school grading, the grades had an independent and large effect on the
distribution of house prices, at least in the short term. Neighborhoods
with schools that had unexpected positive shocks (captured by a favorable
school grade and holding constant all the variables used to construct the
school grades) saw immediate increases in house values, while neighbor-
hoods with schools experiencing unexpected negative shocks saw reduc-
tions in their house values. This finding has direct implications for school
finance. School districts with large numbers of sanctioned schools may
experience reductions, at least in the short term, in their tax bases, thus
requiring either reductions in school spending above and beyond the
amounts of the state and federal sanctions or increases in the local tax
effort to maintain current levels of spending, or increased state effort (and
potential taxation) to maintain local spending. School districts with few
if any sanctioned schools experience effects in the other direction. While it24 Figlio
is currently unknown whether these responses are long term, these results
suggest that arbitrarily assigned school grades might have significant rip-
ple effects in the housing market and on school finance in general.
It is unknown at present whether these house price effects are entirely
redistributive, or if there may be some net gain (or loss) in house prices
generally as a result of an accountability system. On the one hand, if the
general perception of schools in an area improves, then this general in-
crease in the perceived quality of schools should lead to an overall in-
crease in house prices, much as would be the case with any other local
amenity. If the goal of the No Child Left Behind Act is to effect positive
change in school quality, this change in house prices may be an expected
outcome of the federal accountability policy. On the other hand, as de-
scribed above, it is highly likely that a large number of schools will face
sanctions under the federal system. This situation could have the effect
of descreasing public impressions of overall school quality, which may
depress general housing values. It is clearly too soon to know which of
these outcomes is most likely to occur nationally.
5. DESIGN ISSUES FOR STATES
While the No Child Left Behind Act dictates many features of a federal
accountability system, states have considerable flexibility in implement-
ing the federal system and, of course, in implementing and designing
their own systems of accountability. This section details some of the im-
portant design issues relevant for state accountability systems and their
potential effects on the designation of sanctioned schools. Because every
state will implement a different system and because the nature of sanc-
tions are as yet unknown in most cases, it is premature to speculate about
the precise fiscal consequences of these decisions. It is apparent, however,
that some school districts will be influenced fiscally more than others
and that which districts will be influenced depends on the design of the
system. Because school accountability systems introduced by states will
necessarily influence the state's system of aid distribution at least to some
degree, it is worth pointing out that many issues relevant for the design
of school accountability systems are relevant for the design of state aid
systems more generally.
This section describes three of the important design issues for states to
consider as they implement the No Child Left Behind Act or their own
independent systems of school accountability. While the three issues—
aggregation questions, the decision whether to measure a school's value
added, and measurement issues—may not at first appear to have fiscal
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tation of the federal accountability laws could have large fiscal implica-
tions for the states themselves. This section briefly describes each of the
major design issues left for states to determine, then summarizes the most
important fiscal considerations for each decision that states would make.
5.1 Aggregation Issues
Three types of aggregation issues are relevant for both state aid systems
and school accountability systems. The first involves aggregation across
time. In different settings and different contexts, Kane and Staiger (2001)
and Figlio (2002) demonstrated the instability of school rankings based
on test performance from one year to the next. The fundamental problem
here involves measurement error: tests have large stochastic components
to them, and schools deemed improving at one point in time could (al-
most necessarily) be declining at another point. This measurement error
has implications for rewards and sanctions in state aid systems and school
accountability systems: should schools be punished or rewarded on the
basis of a single "good draw" or "bad draw"? These problems are particu-
larly exacerbated when performance is measured by changes in profi-
ciency from one year to the next across different cohorts (as is the case
in many state accountability systems). When average test scores for two
successive years are each measured with error (not least because the class-
room compositions change dramatically, although this fact is not the only
reason for the error), it is unclear what, if anything, is being uncovered
by an accountability system that rewards (penalizes) improvements (fall-
backs) in the fractions of students passing the exam from one cohort to
the next. Kane and Staiger (2001) and Figlio (2002) illustrated that taking
multiyear moving averages considerably reduces the likelihood that mea-
surement error will lead to dramatic instability in measured school perfor-
mance, although it remains a problem.
No time aggregation means that it is harder for sanctioned school to
move out of a sanctioned state, thereby increasing (as described above)
the fiscal costs borne by states and sanctioned school districts. While a
lack of time aggregation could increase the sanction probability for
schools that previously were unsanctioned, this likelihood is far lower.
The reason for this nonlinearity stems from the fact that schools that are
below performance targets may still avoid sanctions by making year-to-
year improvements toward their performance goals. Allowing schools to
aggregate across cohorts over time is less likely to punish improving
schools that are still below performance targets in one or all subgroups
than would a system that requires year-to-year improvements without
permitting cross-cohort averaging. Using the Florida data mentioned
above, I estimated that the fraction of schools sanctioned under a system26 Figlio
without time aggregation is as much as one-fifth higher than would be
the fraction of schools sanctioned under a system with three-year time
aggregation.
A second aggregation issue involves aggregation across types of tests
(or other performance indicators). While mathematics and reading tests,
for instance, tend to trend together within a school, Figlio (2002) shows
that the correlation between changes from one year to the next in one test
relative to another test is quite weak. Therefore, performance standards
that require meeting particular criteria on multiple outputs may be too
difficult to attain (if the standards are set appropriately high) and those
that require cross-cohort improvements in these criteria along multiple
dimensions may merely reward schools with good luck and punish those
with bad luck. This situation is clearly an issue for the federal accountabil-
ity law, where annual yearly progress must be met in both reading and
mathematics. In the federal law, however, only the proficiency target for
schools, rather than the change in proficiency target, moves over time,
making this less of an issue in the federal case than it may be in individual
state cases. Potential solutions to this problem include aggregating multi-
ple outcomes into a single indicator (such as the approach described
above by Duncombe and Yinger, 1999) or evaluating schools on multiple
criteria separately without requiring standards to be met (or improve-
ments to be realized) in every year.
A third aggregation issue to consider involves how multiple subgroups
in a school should be considered. Disaggregating students into subgroups
(say, along racial, ethnic, or socioeconomic lines, or based on prior perfor-
mance levels) exacerbates the measurement error problems described in
the preceding paragraphs and is required by the federal accountability
law. On the other hand, for normative reasons, one may wish to pay spe-
cial attention to the performance of certain subgroups, and indeed many
equity and adequacy discussions (as well as the rationale for the name
of the No Child Left Behind Act itself) have centered on the performance
of minorities, low-income students, and low-achievers. The prescriptions
for the improvement of measurement described above are particularly
relevant when students are divided into groups. Kane and Staiger (2001)
demonstrate that measurement error problems are most acute for small
schools; the same is true for smaller subgroups within schools.
These last two aggregation issues have fiscal consequences similar to
the first aggregation issue. Disaggregating by types of performance indi-
cators and subgroups increases the likelihood of sanctions along two di-
mensions—measurement error problems increase with small samples
(and the samples are necessarily smaller when data are less aggregated)
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difficult for a school to succeed along a larger number of criteria than
along a smaller number. Hence, the more disaggregated the breakdown
by types of tests and subgroups of students, the more likely it is that large
numbers of schools will be sanctioned under the federal accountability
policy, and consequently, the larger the anticipated fiscal burden on
school districts and, presumably, on states. More disaggregation is likely
to exacerbate further the equity issues described previously.
5.2 Evaluating Schools Based on Value Added
The federal accountability law sets proficiency targets for schools and des-
ignates a school as successful if it brings a certain fraction of students
(and eventually all students) up to the minimum acceptable proficiency
level. The normative argument behind this approach is clear: all students
should be expected to achieve at least some reasonable level of academic
success, and schools are delinquent in their duties if they do not bring
students to at least this level. In this view, making progress toward profi-
ciency but not achieving proficiency is unacceptable. But many econo-
mists and educators call instead for evaluating schools based on a
measure of value added, where schools are rated on how much they im-
prove individual students' performance from one year to the next. The
rationale behind this approach is that schools with large numbers of chil-
dren prone to academic success would achieve proficiency goals—even
in the federal program, at least in the early years—regardless of whether
they are truly mediocre (a point illustrated with some of the exercises
presented in the preceding section), and that schools serving impover-
ished populations might fail to meet proficiency targets, even though they
may be excellent in bringing students to basic proficiency levels from their
very low starting points. Figlio and Page (2002), among others, show that
levels-based methods of evaluating schools tend to lead to rankings of
schools that are nearly completely unrelated to value-added-based meth-
ods. The implication of this finding is that many schools that are sanc-
tioned under a levels-based system of school accountability may actually
have quite high value added and should likely be rewarded rather than
punished. The lack of concordance between state and federal accountabil-
ity systems [also described by Kane and Staiger (2001)], may also tend to
undermine the credibility of one or both of the systems in the eyes of the
general population.
Despite their popularity among economists, debate exists as to whether
value-added measures of school performance are really to be preferred
over raw levels of performance. The normative argument presented
above—that schools and students should be held accountable to a given
standard, regardless of background characteristics or starting values—is28 Figlio
compelling to many because it does not prescribe different standards for
different groups of students (or schools). Given the high correlation be-
tween test performance and background characteristics, especially in ag-
gregate, however, evaluating schools solely on performance levels, with
rewards and sanctions associated with said performance, does not seem
fair to schools with large numbers of students predicted to perform poorly
based on background characteristics. While some of these correlations
may be explained by factors within the control of the school system (e.g.,
different expectations for low-income and minority students than for
higher-income and white students), it still defies reason to suggest that
all of these differences are due to controllable factors. Thus, equity con-
cerns with evaluating schools solely on the basis of the level of test perfor-
mance are valid.
There are other reasons, however, to believe that value-added measures
of evaluating schools may not be a panacea. Gains in test scores within
a cohort may reflect school contributions but may also reflect unmeasured
student and family characteristics. Student background characteristics are
often found to be correlated with gains in test scores as well as test score
levels, though this finding is not universal, and it is not necessarily the
case that schools with high starting values also experience high gains.
These correlations may be due to differential school selection by families
of different types, but they could also point to different family inputs,
either independently of or jointly with the school's efforts. They may also
indicate that schools serving high-socioeconomic-status families may be
better able to find resources to boost instruction and outcomes in tested
subjects. These correlations suggest that value-added measures of school
productivity should be taken with a grain of salt.
Another potential problem with some forms of value-added measures
is that they might invite manipulating the system. If schools are rewarded
on the basis of cross-cohort changes in test scores (for instance, comparing
fourth-graders in 2002 to fourth-graders in 2001, rather than comparing
the same students from year to year) schools may be rewarded by under-
performing in one year to facilitate greater gains the next. But even if
school gaming does not generate problems with this type of system, mea-
surement error might. Recall the Kane and Staiger (2001) argument men-
tioned above on measurement error and their finding that schools that
show poor gains in one year tend to show high gains the next, and vice
versa. Measuring value added based on following the same students
rather than different groups of students solves some of these problems,
but only partially. In sum, while value-added systems of measuring
school performance are likely better than most systems, they can't solve
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But even if a state were to introduce a system of value-added-based
school accountability, how exactly to quantify a school's value added is
open to debate. At the very least, however, accounting for value added
requires some control for circumstances such as student and family back-
ground characteristics. Typically, however, student background charac-
teristics (or, more specifically, the background characteristics available in
administrative data) explain only a small portion of the observed varia-
tion in individual test scores. (Student information aggregated to the
school level does a better job in explaining aggregate test scores, although
this method too is extremely incomplete.) Therefore, it seems important to
go beyond observed background attributes when measuring value added.
Measures that aggregate changes in student test scores from year to
year are arguably closer indicators of a school's contribution to student
outcomes than are those measures that consider only a level test score.
These measures range in complexity from the extremely simple and trans-
parent (for instance, simply averaging year-to-year test score gains) to
very complicated models that impose considerable structure on the rela-
tionships between inputs and outputs. All models of value added require
annual (or at least extremely frequent) testing of students with tests that
can be vertically equated—that is, the test scores for one grade can be
compared to those of the next—and tests that are administered uniformly
across schools. Even more fundamentally, the administrative data system
must be able to follow students reliably from year to year.
As mentioned above, value-added measures of school performance, re-
gardless of how they are measured, are still imperfect indicators of a
school's contribution to student gains. Given the correlations often found
between student test score gains and background characteristics, it may
be that additional correction for student body attributes is warranted. This
decision is not obvious, however, and depends in part on what the ac-
countability system seeks to measure.
All measures of school performance based on standardized tests must
also address the question of which students should be included in the
test pool for the purposes of standards and accountability. This question is
inherently normative and political rather than scientific, though it derives
from a positive debate. Key decisions must be made about whether mo-
bile populations are counted in the accountability testing pool, as well
as whether disabled students should be considered for school reporting
purposes. The state of Florida, for instance, has taken two very different
tacks with regard to student mobility. In the first iteration of the A+ Plan
for Education, Governor Jeb Bush's education reform enacted in 1999,
school evaluations were based not only on stable students but also stu-
dents who recently arrived in the school. But the next year, school grades30 Figlio
were based only on students present in the school for the entire school
year up to the testing date. These rule changes had substantial implica-
tions for schools and students, and the sets of schools identified as low
quality or high quality changed considerably when only the more stable
set of students were included. The federal accountability system limits
students counted for a school's proficiency goals to those spending the
full academic year in the evaluated school, but mobile students still
count for district proficiency goals. States also vary with respect to which
disabled students should remain in the test pool for the purposes of
constructing performance measures. Florida, for example, excludes all
disabled students, even test-taking students, from the school-level aggre-
gates used to measure productivity. Virginia goes to the other extreme:
including all disabled students in the accountability pool except for the
rather small fraction who are explicitly excluded in their individualized
education plans from testing. In this regard, the federal accountability
system is much closer to the Virginia approach to counting disabled stu-
dents than it is to the Florida system, and in fact requires schools to meet
proficiency goals for disabled students (except the most seriously disabled
populations) as a listed subgroup.
These issues pose substantial trade-offs to policymakers seeking to de-
velop accountability and state aid systems. A policymaker deciding
whether to include or exclude mobile students or disabled students, for
example, may wish to exclude these students from the pool for the pur-
poses of gauging school performance out of a concern for fairness. Schools
with large fractions of mobile and disabled students could argue, with
validity, that they are being judged on factors outside their control. On
the other hand, excluding students on the basis of classification provides
schools with the incentive to selectively reclassify or move students to
look better against performance metrics.
The case of special education is a margin that may be worked for these
purposes. Cullen (2002) and Cullen and Figlio (1998) have demonstrated
that schools tend to reclassify students along the special education margin
in response to fiscal incentives, and Knapp (2002) demonstrates that
schools' classifications of students are responsive to parental fiscal incen-
tives as well. And as mentioned previously, Cullen and Reback (2002),
Figlio and Getzler (2002), and Jacob (2002) show that special education
classification also responds to accountability incentives. While the federal
accountability law will present only limited incentives for reclassifying
low-performing students as disabled to evade inclusion in the school's
test pool, state accountability systems may still provide these incentives.
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as a subgroup with its own proficiency goals, may actually present in-
centives for school districts to overclassify potentially high-performing
students as disabled to yield improvements in the disabled group's profi-
ciency levels. Of course, these incentives also have a different form of
implications for school finance because the increased classification of mar-
ginal students as special education students increases total education
costs for school districts and states.
The same types of trade-offs are relevant for the decision to move from
levels-based assessment of schools for accountability and school finance
to a more value-added-based assessment. The argument for value added
is very much the same as the argument for excluding disabled and mobile
students from the high-stakes (for schools) testing pool: schools with cer-
tain populations that tend to fare worse on standardized examinations
argue that their quality is masked by the poor outcomes of students start-
ing at a low level. On the other hand, introducing value added (or even
controlling for background factors) raises political concerns, because it
becomes more difficult for the lay public to interpret the assessment of
schools, and because explicitly controlling for different student composi-
tion is seen by some as making excuses for poor performance, or alterna-
tively, holding different types of students (and hence, schools) to different
standards. (The latter reason is currently a popular argument.) It is possi-
ble that including background characteristics as part of a cost correction,
as explained by Duncombe and Yinger (1999), might be a politically palat-
able way to control partly for student attributes in an environment where
it would be difficult to do so otherwise.
School accountability and school finance systems may provide different
incentives for schools to reclassify, move, or hold back students. While
school accountability systems tend to encourage schools to classify stu-
dents as disabled, for instance, school finance systems may either encour-
age or discourage this practice, depending on the financial incentive
structure. For instance, some states compensate school districts for dis-
abled students on the basis of predicted disability caseloads rather than
actual disability counts. In such a case, reclassifying a student as disabled
to avoid that student being counted in an accountability system will be
costly to the district that must now provide special services for the student
without additional compensation from the state. On the other hand, other
states provide compensation to districts that exceeds the excess cost neces-
sary to educate marginal students if they are classified as disabled. In
these states, both the school accountability and school finance systems
provide strong incentives to overclassify students. Similarly, moving stu-
dents from school to school across years may lead to increased costs to32 Figlio
school districts, but school accountability systems that exclude mobile stu-
dents may provide sufficient incentives to make these moves worthwhile
for school districts.
The choice of measuring school performance using levels rather than
value-added approaches also has fiscal implications. In the years after
initial implementation of the policy, it will become progressively more
difficult to meet accountability goals under No Child Left Behind than it
would under a value-added approach because the ultimate goal is 100
percent proficiency under the levels-based federal law. Gaming along the
lines mentioned above is likely to be more simple when using a levels-
based system of school performance measurement than when using
value-added measures, which implies that levels-based systems may gen-
erate greater indirect fiscal costs for states and school districts than might
value-added-based systems of school accountability.
5.3 Measuring Costs of Education
Of central importance in the school finance reforms implemented across
the nation over the past two decades has been the notion of equality of
educational opportunity. In the school finance context, this notion in-
volves not only considering policies that tend to equalize spending across
school districts within a state, but also policies that correct for the different
costs of educational provision across school districts. A discussion of mea-
suring educational costs in the present context is relevant for several rea-
sons. First, many of the same issues that arise in the determination of
school performance appear in different contexts in the determination of
cost differences across schools. Second, accountability systems themselves
may directly and indirectly influence cross-district costs of education,
which then directly affects school finance systems.
The rationale for adjusting for cost differences is very similar, theoreti-
cally, to the rationale for measuring value added to schools in educational
production: when two schools face very different circumstances, the
schools have varying difficulties in meeting any type of performance goal.
Duncombe and Yinger (1999) provide a "temperature standard" meta-
phor for schools: it takes fewer resources to heat a school in Florida to 72
degrees Fahrenheit in the winter than it does to heat a school in Wisconsin
to the same temperature. Providing the same heating budget to both
schools would lead to dramatic differences in measured productivity
along one dimension (in terms of actual comfort level attained), but this
situation would not separate factors that are in the control of school offi-
cials from those that are outside this control. The purpose of cost adjust-
ments is to guarantee, as best as possible, that two schools facing very
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of student outcomes after adjustment. The word potential is important
here because it highlights a key conceptual question in the design of state
aid systems—whether ex ante versus ex post realization of the goal is the
relevant barometer of success. One ex ante view of this issue would be to
make cost adjustments to schools without regard to differences in produc-
tivity—two schools, after appropriate cost adjustments are made, would
have equal chance of success. An ex post view of this issue would possibly
take differential productivity into account and may make additional ad-
justments to account for differences in school productivity. Which view
of the issue is adopted is inherently a political question.
Any researcher or practitioner involved in school finance can attest to
the fact that school districts face substantial differences in the costs of
educating their student populations. These differences exist for numerous
reasons, not least because student populations vary considerably in their
needs. Special education population differences, described somewhat
above, are but one of the sources of this variance. Other differences occur
because of varying needs for remediation and other types of educational
services.
These same characteristics associated with increased basic costs of ser-
vices may also influence input prices. Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin (1998),
among others, show that teachers are more likely to select more affluent
and majority-white schools when they have the opportunity, and Figlio
(1997b) shows that high-paying (generally suburban) school districts can
attract high-quality teachers away from their lower-paying neighbors, in-
dependent of school and student body attributes. Numerous authors,
such as Ferguson (1991), Ferguson and Ladd (1996), Goldhaber and
Brewer (1997), Hanushek et al. (1998), and Wright et al. (1997), have
shown that teacher quality (though not the types of attributes typically
rewarded by teacher salary structures) significantly increase student out-
comes. Taken together, it is reasonable to expect that teacher dollars at
some schools do not go as far as they do in other schools. Given the wide-
spread recognition that costs differ substantially across school districts,
it is somewhat surprising that states rarely attempt to adjust systemati-
cally for costs. Cost adjustments are often made in ad hoc ways, with
potentially deleterious consequences that could become even more appar-
ent in an era of adequacy standards and school accountability. Cost ad-
justments that do not take into account both the direct and indirect cost
differences associated with educating different types of schools will likely
lead to systematic underprovision of school services for low-income and
minority students relative to their high-income, white counterparts.
Introducing school accountability and performance standards, even if
not incorporated directly into the state aid formula, can have significant34 Figlio
consequences for cost adjustments. Increased school choice that is tied
to school accountability, for instance, may exacerbate school district cost
differentials if students from already high-cost, low-socioeconomic-status
districts are provided an exit option and particularly if the most motivated
families are the most likely to leave their existing school. Along similar
lines, some high-achieving students attending schools branded as low-
performing may also enter the private sector and leave the public sector
altogether. These types of responses suggest that cost adjustments may
need to be updated even more frequently in an era of school accountabil-
ity than in a regime with less accountability-driven choice. As mentioned
above, school accountability systems, including the federal program to a
lesser degree, may provide schools with an incentive to overclassify stu-
dents as disabled or to retain low-performing students with higher fre-
quency. These types of responses, and the fact that they are likely to occur
differentially, suggest that the relative costs of districts are likely to
change as schools are held more accountable.
These issues raise implications for school finance equity. State cost ad-
justments for low-socioeconomic-status school districts may need to
change depending on the school choice or teacher labor market effects
resulting from the response to the school accountability system. These
effects depend on the degree to which states seek to equalize equality of
educational opportunity. But in many states, there will be no choice, and
state supreme courts may demand alterations to states' school finance
systems as a direct consequence of the federal accountability law.
6. CONCLUSION
The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, likely the most important piece of
federal legislation concerning elementary and secondary schools in sev-
eral decades, lays out a major new way in which federal school aid is
distributed. This paper outlines some of the most important fiscal implica-
tions of this policy change and suggests that the federal accountability
system, as written, may substantially increase fiscal pressures on low-
income school districts and perhaps also on states (via state school finance
equity goals). These fiscal effects are both direct and indirect, and are
likely influenced by decisions that states will make as they implement the
federal accountability policy. While the magnitudes of these implications
are not possible to identify, back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that
the effects could be reasonably large for a nontrivial number of school
districts. Ironically, the school districts placed under increased pressure
might not be the districts most deserving of sanction, if indeed measure-
ment of a school's value added is the desired metric. (This last point,Fiscal Implications of School Accountability Initiatives 35
obviously, is debatable, as mentioned above.) In sum, while the new
federal accountability system holds considerable promise for aiding and
improving schools and students, considerable concerns about its implica-
tions, both educationally and fiscally, also exist.
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